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Can an increasing number of firms and brands exacerbate 
problems related to asymmetric information on product 
quality?. This working paper analyzes this trade-off be-
tween variety and information using Salop’s (1979) 
framework by introducing quality uncertainty and a simple 
information diffusion process. As the number of firms 
increases, the marginal benefits of lower prices and wider 
product variety may be outweighed by a reduction in con-
sumer information and average quality. Thus, market ex-
pansions require a parallel improvement in information 
mechanisms. Because information has public good charac-
teristics, it is an open question as to how efficiently the 
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¿Puede el incremento del número de empresas acentuar los 
problemas de información asimétrica sobre la calidad de 
los productos? Este documento de trabajo analiza el posi-
ble trade-off entre la variedad de la oferta y la información 
de los consumidores, utilizando el marco teórico de Salop 
(1979) en el que se introduce incertidumbre sobre la cali-
dad y un sencillo mecanismo de difusión de la informa-
ción. Conforme el número de empresas aumenta, los bene-
ficios marginales de precios más bajos y de una mayor 
variedad de productos se ven superados por una reducción 
en la información de los consumidores y en la calidad 
promedio de la oferta. En consecuencia, la expansión y la 
globalización de los mercados requieren de una mejora en 
paralelo de los mecanismos de información hacia los con-
sumidores. Dado que la información tiene características 
de bien público, es una cuestión abierta la eficiencia con la 
que los mercados responden a esta necesidad. 
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CAN an increasing number of brands exacerbate problems related to asymmetric information 
on product quality? If so, then can an increase in the number of firms reduce incentives to 
produce high-quality goods? Could the (marginal) negative welfare effect of lower expected 
quality exceed in some markets the (marginal) benefits of lower prices and increased variety 
that a larger number of firms provides? These questions are important, given that economic 
growth, globalization, and Internet retailing have produced a vast increase in the number of 
sellers and brands available to consumers
1. 
This working paper is a first step in exploring the potential trade-off between product 
variety and information, and its welfare consequences. We extend Salop’s (1979) model of 
horizontal differentiation by introducing both uncertainty about product quality and a simple 
information accumulation process on firm types (i.e., the types determining the probability of 
producing lemons). We keep the model as simple as possible; specifically, there are only two 
possible product qualities, two types of firms with respect to the probability of producing 
bad-quality goods, and two periods. 
We first consider a model in which the initial number and type distribution of firms 
are exogenous. We show that second-period expected quality decreases with the number of 
firms. The reason is that as the number of firms increases, the information accumulation 
process on firm type becomes less effective. As the number of brands increases, the average 
number of observations per product is reduced. Then, the spread of good and bad reputations 
among firms is based on less information. As a result, a larger fraction of low-quality firms 
are able to stay in the market for a longer period, thereby lowering average product quality. 
If the value of quality is large enough with respect to the value of variety, then as the number 
                                                      
1 For example, according to a 2003 report from the consulting firm McKinsey the number of brands 
on US grocery store shelves tripled in the 1990s from 15,000 to 45,000. Between 1970 and 1997, the 
number of vehicle models increased from 140 to 260 and the number brands of bottled water in-
creased from 16 to 50 (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 1998). By 2009, the number of vehicles and 
brands of water were 365 and 128 respectively (www.automotive.com and www.bottledwater.org). In 
turn, Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate that imported product varieties in the US increased by a 







of firms increases, the negative effect of diminishing expected quality can eventually offset 
the benefits of lower prices and wider diversity. 
In the second part of the paper, we extend our model to endogenize the number of 
firms and distribution of firm types. In equilibrium, a larger global market implies more 
firms in each local market but fewer incentives to produce good-quality products
2. In addi-
tion to the negative effect that low-quality firms survive longer in a market with more firms, 
now a larger fraction of firms choose to be bad-quality producers. Under some plausible 
conditions, we find that there is an optimal market size from a social welfare point of view. 
Beyond that optimal size, the negative (marginal) expected-quality effect of larger markets 
outweighs the favorable (marginal) price and wider-variety effects. 
It should be clear that the analysis in this paper does not mean that, as a result of the 
increase in the number of brands and suppliers, average quality and social welfare tend now 
to be lower than they were previously. Average product quality seems to have experienced a 
significant increase over the last decades as a result of technological progress. The very styl-
ized model proposed in this paper abstracts from the continuous process of technological 
improvements. Our point is that the large increase in the number of suppliers is likely to 
exacerbate asymmetric information problems related to product quality, which in turn may to 
some extent offset the positive effects of stronger competition and technological progress. 
Thus, the ultimate message of this paper is that the expansion of markets and the ensuing 
increase in the number of firms require a parallel development of information mechanisms. 
Of course, markets respond with new mechanisms to these increasing information 
needs. However, it cannot be taken for granted that such mechanisms are always developed 
rapidly and efficiently, as consumer information has public good characteristics. In recent 
years, new information mechanisms have grown at an extraordinary pace. Product reviews 
by magazines, consumer associations, and especially websites have given rise to an informa-
tion industry that has a measurable impact: see Chevalier and Mayzlin (2003) for the effect 
on sales of online consumer reviews. Nonetheless, these mechanisms have their own specific 
                                                      
2 If information flows more easily within local markets than across them (as with word-of-mouth), 
then information per brand in each local market (i.e., the number of observations about each brand's 








3. Moreover, even if the Internet greatly extends word-of-mouth possibilities, direct 
contact with friends, family, and co-workers still seems to be the primary source of reliable 
information on product quality
4. 
In sum, this paper is a first step in investigating the possible trade-off between the 
number of firms (or market size) on the one hand and consumer information and average 
quality on the other. We take consumer information mechanisms as given, with the leading 
example being word-of-mouth within local markets. We leave for future research questions 
regarding whether markets provide appropriate incentives for creating new information 
mechanisms and how efficient these new mechanisms may be in solving the wider informa-
tion problems raised by the expansion and globalization of markets
5. 
Our work is related to the literature on experience goods (Nelson, 1970) and reputa-
tion (see Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008, for a survey). The literature on reputation analyzes the 
incentives to produce (costly) high-quality goods instead of (cheap) low-quality goods when 
consumers cannot distinguish them before consumption. Here, we are interested in how firm 
incentives and consumer information depend on the size of the market and the number of 
competitors. Whereas the pioneering works of Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) 
apply their analysis in the context of perfect competition, much of the following literature 
                                                      
3 Reviews of product quality in the Internet can be manipulated by sellers, are difficult to interpret 
(reviewers have to be reviewed themselves), do not have zero cost (that is, reading them can be very 
time consuming), and have been found to be systematically biased in directions and to degrees that are 
difficult to assess even using sophisticated statistical tools. For example, Hu et al. (2006) analyze the 
case of books, DVDs, and videos and find that Internet reviews have bimodal distributions. Appar-
ently, reviews are biased because people are much more prone to write a review when they are very 
satisfied or very unsatisfied with the product. As they are not random samples, these rating results are 
very difficult to interpret and may be misleading. 
4 Recent research from Nielsen, a well-known consulting firm on consumer media and marketplace 
behavior reveals that 90% of consumers consider recommendations from people they know to be 
trustworthy, much more than information from any other sources; see Nielsen Global Online Con-
sumer Survey. Trust, Value and Engagement in Advertising (2009), which is available at 
http://pl.nielsen.com/trends/documents/Niel-senTrustAdvertisingGlobalReportJuly09.pdf. According 
to Keller and Berry (2006) from the consulting firm Keller Fay Group, 90% of word-of-mouth con-
versations still occur face to face, while only 7% occur online. See also Dellarocas (2003) for a survey 
on the role of new information technologies on word-of-mouth communication. 
5 See Armstrong (2008) for a discussion on problems associated with the so-called market for market 







focuses on the case of a single seller. More recent papers analyze the effect of different de-
grees of competition in providing incentives for quality reputation; see Hörner (2002), Kran-
ton (2003), Bar-Isaac (2005), Rob and Fishman (2005), Rob and Sekiguchi (2006), Marimon 
et al. (2009), and Dana and Fong (2010). In these papers, different degrees of competition 
affect firm incentives for quality through their impact on profit margins and the potential for 
consumer defection. In this paper, we focus on a different mechanism; namely, the impact of 
market size and the number of firms on average consumer information, which in turn deter-
mines the distribution of product quality in the market. To the extent of our knowledge, this 
paper is the first to suggest a possible trade-off between product diversity and consumer 
information. 
The paper is also related to the industrial organization literature on information dif-
fusion and word-of-mouth, as has been investigated by Kennedy (1994), Vettas (1997), and 
Navarro (2008) in the context of monopolies, and by Caminal and Vives (1996 and 1999) in 
the context of duopolies. Again, this literature has not explored how the precision of con-
sumer information depends on the number of firms in the market. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze average qual-
ity and welfare as a function of the number of firms, taking the number and type distribution 
of firms in the market as exogenous. We first consider a very simple information diffusion 
mechanism and carry out the analysis under some further simplifying assumptions. Then, we 
extend the analysis using a more general, abstract mechanism. In section 3, we endogenize 
the number and type distribution of firms. In this setting, we explore the consequences of 
market expansion on average quality and welfare. We summarize and conclude in section 4. 
2.  Uncertain Quality and the Number of Firms 
WE build our model on the circular city model proposed by Salop (1979). There are n firms 
and A consumers uniformly distributed around a circular city with a perimeter equal to 1. All 
firms have the same constant marginal cost  0 c   and set their prices simultaneously. There 
are linear transportation costs x  , where  x  is the distance between the consumer and the 







may be interpreted as a space of product characteristics; consumers have different prefer-
ences over these characteristics, while firms choose which characteristics to supply. We will 
also refer to   as the value of proximity between a consumer’s location and a firm’s location 
or between a consumer’s preferences and product characteristics. Each consumer buys only 
one unit of the good per period as long as the cost (that is, price plus transportation) does not 
exceed the good’s expected value. 
We embed this standard horizontal-differentiation setting into a two-period model 
and introduce three new features: 
1)  Goods may be good quality (denoted  1 q  ) or bad quality (i.e., lemons, de-
noted as  0 q  ). 
2)  Firms may be of high type (H) or low type (L). H-type firms only produce good 
quality. In contrast, each unit produced by an L-type firm is good quality with 
probability   , 01    , and is a lemon with probability 1   . 
3)  Consumers cannot observe the quality of goods before they consume them, nor 
can they directly observe firms’ types. At the beginning of period 1, they hold 
the same priors about each firm’s type. At the end of the first period, each con-
sumer has one observation about the firm’s output that she bought (i.e., she 
knows whether the firm delivered a good-quality unit or a lemon). Then, con-
sumers update their priors about firm types based on their consumption experi-
ence in that period and the experience of other consumers. They then decide 
which firm to buy from in the second period. 
The value of consuming one unit of a good is V if  1 q   and zero if  0 q  . Consum-
ers and firms discount second-period utility and profits using the same factor  0   . The 
fraction of firms that are H-type in the first period is  , 01    . This fraction is exoge-
nous in this section but will become endogenous in section 3. Parameters   and   are 
common knowledge. Note that no firm will charge a price below c  in the second period. 
The following simplifying assumption ensures that consumers would never buy from an L-







Assumption (1) cV    
The (per capita) expected discounted consumer surplus is: 
            11 1 2 2 2 EC S V Eq P d V Eq EP Ed             (1) 
where    . E  is the expectation operator, qt is quality at period t, Pt is price, and dt is the aver-
age distance between a consumer’s locations and the location of the firm from which the 
consumer buys. Every term in this expression depends on the number of firms in the corre-







           ( 2 )  
For reasons that will become clear below, prices in the second period are given by 
the standard version of Salop’s (1979) model. However, in period 1, there may exist dif-
ferent price equilibria, which can be sustained by appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs. 
At any rate, prices have no influence on social welfare in the model in this section. Any 
increase in price only represents a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers (be-
cause all consumers buy one unit of the good as long as the price is low enough, whereas 
the number of firms does not depend on prices). Moreover, we restrict our analysis to 
symmetric pooling equilibria. 
In each period, expected quality depends on the type composition of firms. Because 
this composition is given by   in the first period and all firms have the same market share, 
expected quality at period 1 is: 
  1 (1 ) Eq             ( 3 )  
Expected quality in the second period depends on how much information is collected 
by each consumer at the end of period 1 and how this information drives some L-type firms 
out of the market. Recall that each consumer directly obtains a single observation on one 
firm’s output. Each consumer’s experience may then be transmitted to other consumers at 
the end of period 1 (e.g., by means of an information-diffusion mechanism such as word-of-







tins). We consider two different settings in this respect. In subsection 2.1, we assume the 
simple case in which all consumers share all of their information. Furthermore, we simplify 
the computation of equilibrium in this subsection by assuming a large number of firms. In 
subsection 2.2, we generalize the results by considering an abstract information-diffusion 
and firm-sorting mechanism that is characterized by a general property. 
Ignoring at this point the possible existence of fixed costs (they are introduced in 
section 3), per capita expected social welfare is: 
            11 2 2 1 ES W VEq d VEq Ed c               (4) 
As is well known, asymmetric information on product quality may create difficulties 
for the existence of markets (Akerlof 1970). In addition, transportation costs may be so high 
as to dissuade some consumers from buying goods. We consider economies such that in 
equilibrium all consumers buy one unit of the good at each period. This is ensured by the 
following assumption. 
Assumption (2)   
1
3
2 (1 ) n Vc        
This assumption guarantees that for the consumer who is farthest away from her 
closest firm, expected utility in the first period is at least as large as the good’s price plus 
transportation cost
6. In what follows, we omit the subindex 1 when denoting the initial num-
ber of firms in order to simplify the notation (i.e.,  1 nn  ). 
2.1.  A simple information-diffusion mechanism 
In this subsection, we assume that each consumer’s information about the quality of 
the good she consumed in period 1 is transmitted to the entire population before anyone de-
cides which firm to buy from in the second period. Hence, consumption in the first period 
produces a sample of size  / mA n   of each firm’s output, where m is also sales per firm. 
                                                      
6 It can be shown that if assumption (2) holds, then all consumers are willing to buy in the second 







This sample is available to all consumers
7. Because H-type firms only produce good quality, 
Bayesian updating implies that firms that produce one or more bad-quality units reveal to be 
L-type to all consumers at the end of period 1. As a result of this and assumption (1), these 
firms abandon the market. Remaining firms relocate uniformly around the city circle at the 
beginning of the second period. 
Let B be the fraction of L-type firms surviving into the second period. This is a ran-
dom variable with mean 
/ An  , which is the probability that an L-type firm produces A/n 
high-quality units in a row. We simplify computations by substituting 
/ An   for B. This sub-
stitution can be justified assuming that n is large enough so that the Law of Large Numbers 
implies that 
/ An B    . In the next subsection, we solve the model taking into account the 
whole distribution of B and show that the same results hold. Thus, using 
/ An   to substitute 
for B, the number of surviving firms in the second period is: 
2 (1 )
A
n nn      
        ( 5 )  
Note that  2 / nn  (that is, the proportion of firms surviving into the second period) is 
increasing in n; in fact,  2 limn nn   . Thus, the fraction of L-type firms that are disclosed 
decreases with n. As a result, expected quality of aggregate output in the second period, 
















        ( 6 )  
Expected per capita social welfare is then easily obtained using expressions (2), (3) 
and (6) to substitute in (4): 
    1 ES W VQ D c            ( 7 )  
 
 
                                                      
7 As in Salop’s (1979) original model, the total population A is treated as a continuum and, presuma-
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   
   
     
   
 (8) 
The first term in expression (7) is the expected discounted value of consumption. 
The second term is the expected discounted cost of distance. An increase in the number of 
firms has two opposing effects on    ES W. On the positive side, it reduces the average dis-
tance between firm and consumer location (or between product characteristics and consumer 





   . On the 
negative side, an increase in the number of firms raises the fraction of L-type firms that stay 
in the market in the second period, thereby lowering expected quality in that period. This is 













  . 
 


















Note: Marginal information and marginal distance effects as a function of the number of firms n. Their crossing determines the number of firms 
n
SW that maximizes social welfare. 







The marginal distance effect tends to infinity as the number of firms approaches zero 
and decreases monotonically as the number of firms increases because having additional 
brands available is decreasingly valuable to consumers. However, the relationship between 
the marginal information effect and the number of firms is not monotonic. If consumers have 
as much information as they need, then an additional piece of information is worthless. This 
is what tends to happen if the number of firms is very small; in this case, consumers can 
identify all low-quality firms at the end of the first period with almost certainty. Hence, the 
marginal information effect tends to zero as the number of firms approaches zero. However, 
as the number of firms increases, consumer information becomes less precise so that addi-
tional pieces of information become more valuable. Thus, the marginal information effect 
rises, at least for some interval of n. Whether this marginal information effect may at some 
point become larger than the marginal distance effect depends on consumer valuation for 
quality, V, with respect to consumer valuation for proximity,  . The smaller that   is, the 
less important the marginal distance effect is. Conversely, the larger that V is, the more im-
portant the negative marginal information effect is. If the ratio  / V   is sufficiently large, 
then there exists a number of firms  0
SW n   such that the two schedules cross each other; 
that is, for 
SW nn   we have 
() () Qn Dn
nn V 

     (see figure 1). Thus, social welfare is 
maximized at this point. Furthermore, 
SW n  decreases with the importance of quality with 





   curve upwards, whereas a reduction in   shifts the  D
n  
    curve downwards
8. 
Results are summarized as follows
9: 
                                                      















   from below. 
SW n  would correspond to the maximum of the set of local 
maxima. This second order condition guarantees the comparative-statics results. 
9 Salop (1979) also finds that the number of firms may be excessive from the social welfare point of 
view. However, his result crucially depends on the existence of strictly positive fixed costs: if there 
are no fixed costs, then social welfare is always increasing with the number of firms. In the present 
model, results do not depend on firms having positive fixed costs. More importantly, the mechanism 
is very different from that in Salop's (1979) model. The mechanism here is linked to increasing infor-







Proposition (1): If the value of consuming good quality is large enough with respect 
to the value of proximity (as measured by the ratio  / V  ), then expected social wel-
fare is maximized for a finite (initial) number of firms 
SW n . Beyond 
SW n , the posi-
tive (marginal) distance effect produced by a large number of firms is outweighed by 
the negative (marginal) expected-quality effect. Moreover, 
SW n  decreases with the 
value of quality V and increases with the value of proximity  . 
Proof. See appendix A in section 5. 
We can perform a similar analysis in terms of consumer surplus. As noted before, we 
restrict our analysis to pooling equilibria and consider Salop’s (1979) equilibrium price in 
the first period
10. The reason for considering Salop’s (1979) prices is that they constitute a 
simple benchmark that has the appealing property that prices monotonically converge to 
marginal costs as the number of firms tends to infinity. The standard Bertrand equilibrium in 






           ( 9 )  
Using equation (9) for prices, the expression for expected discounted consumer sur-
plus is very similar to (7): 
  EC S VQ P D            ( 1 0 )  
                                                                                                                                                      
mation and a single product quality. Finally, note also that consumer surplus is always increasing in 
the number of firms in Salop's (1979) model, which is not the case in this model (see proposition [2]). 
10 Salop’s (1979) prices can be sustained in the first period by out-of-equilibrium beliefs that interpret 
deviations to a lower price as a signal of an L-type firm. Another potentially interesting (though 
somewhat more complex) equilibrium arises if consumers draw no strategic inference whatsoever 
about a firm’s type from its mere decision to deviate. Because deviating to a lower price in the first 
period would increase sales, H-type firms may have incentives to decrease the price in order to gener-
ate a larger sample, and thus, more information about their product. This decrease in price would 
increase the willingness of consumers to pay for the firm’s output in the second period. We consider 
these out-of-equilibrium beliefs and analyze the resulting equilibrium in appendix B in section 6. We 
show that the first-period prices in this equilibrium are lower than Salop’s (1979) prices. However, the 







where    12 /. PD D P P      Note that   1251 PD D P P D c           . 









  . It is then easy to see that the same results for social welfare in proposition (1) 
hold for consumer surplus, except that the condition that  / V   must be sufficiently large has 
to be reinforced. Because the price and marginal distance effect is five times larger than the 
marginal distance effect,  / V   now must be larger than in proposition (1). 
Proposition (2): If the ratio  / V   is large enough, then expected consumer surplus is 
maximized for a finite (initial) number of firms 
CS n . Beyond 
CS n , the positive 
(marginal) price and distance effect produced by a larger number of firms is out-
weighed by the negative (marginal) expected-quality effect. Moreover, 
CS n  is de-
creasing in V and increasing in  . 
2.2.  A general mechanism 
We now generalize the results by considering an abstract firm-sorting mechanism 
that is characterized by a simple property. Recall that B is the fraction of L-type firms exist-
ing in the first period that survive into the second period. The firm-sorting mechanism speci-
fies the probability distribution of B, which has support [0, 1], as a function of the parame-
ters of the economy in the first period. Specifically, let    , Bn   be the cumulative distribu-
tion function of B, which depends on the number of firms in the first period. The expected 
number of firms and quality in the second period respectively are: 
  
1

















        ( 1 2 )  
Then, expected social welfare is still given by expression (7), though Q and D are 



































   

      (13)
 
Differentiating (7) with respect to n and taking (13) into account, we can explore 
the existence of a maximizer. The existence depends on the characteristics of   , Bn  . 
We postulate that given the rest of parameters in the economy (such as A,   , and  ), 
the larger that n  is, the higher the probability is that low-type firms survive into the sec-
ond period. The reason is that given the total consumption of the good, a larger number 
of firms in the market implies fewer observations of each firm’s output. This is true re-
gardless of which information diffusion mechanisms are present in the economy. There-
fore, larger n implies less chances per period that consumers recognize low-type firms 
and stop buying from them. In other words, larger n leads to distributions of B that first-
order stochastically dominate the distributions resulting from lower n. Moreover, we also 
postulate that as the number of observations per firm tends to infinity ( 0 n  ), all L-
type firms are disclosed and driven out of the market at the end of the first period. For-
mally, we have the following assumption. 
Assumption (3)    0 lim 0, 1 n Bn      and    ,/ 0 Bn n    for all  (0,1) B   
Under this assumption, the analysis is analogous to that in the previous subsection. 




   and. For small n, the positive marginal dis-









  . However, if the value of quality V is large enough with respect to the value 







tually dominates the marginal distance effect. Thus, proposition (1) is generalized as fol-
lows
11: 
Proposition (3): Consider an economy in which L-type firms are driven out of the 
market according to a firm-sorting mechanism that satisfies assumption (3). If  / V   
is sufficiently large, then expected social welfare is maximized for a finite (initial) 
number of firms 
SW n . Moreover, 
SW n  is decreasing in V and increasing in  . 
Proof. See appendix A in section 5. 
If consumer information is based on consumption experiences across the set of 
consumers, then most information diffusion mechanisms (such as word-of-mouth, reg-
istry of consumer complaints, and Internet reviews) would likely lead to a sorting of 
firms as characterized by assumption (3). Given the rest of the parameters in the econ-
omy, such as the number of consumers, larger n implies fewer observations of each 
firm’s output. The fewer observations per unit of time there are on each firm’s output, 
the less likely it is that low-quality firms are rapidly disclosed and driven out of the 
market. If this general principle stands, then the main message of the paper (namely, 
that larger markets may reduce welfare in some industries due to information prob-
lems) is likely to follow independently of the details of the information diffusion 
mechanism. 
3.  Entry and Quality in Expanding Markets 
IN this section, we endogenize the initial number n of firms and the initial distribution of 
their types   as a function of market size. We then explore the relationship between market 
size, and average quality and welfare. 
                                                      







There is free entry to the market subject to fixed costs. Firms can choose to be 
H-type, in which case they pay entry costs  H K , or L-type, in which case they pay  L K ; 
0 HL KK  . In all other respects, the technology is the same as before. Marginal costs 
c are the same for both firm types, and each unit that is produced by an L-type firm will 
turn out to be a lemon with probability 1   , whereas H-type firms never produce lem-
ons. Thus, we now have a three-stage model. At time 0, firms choose whether or not to 
enter the market and which type of firm to be. Then, periods 1 and 2 evolve as described 
above. 
We carry out the analysis using the simple setting considered in subsection 2.1, 
though instead of a single city we now consider a global market comprised by z identical 
circular cities (local markets or countries). Each city has A consumers who are uniformly 
distributed around the circle. The size of the (global) market is denoted by S; Sz A . We 
analyze the consequences of market expansions consisting of increases in z, with A remain-
ing constant. Thus, market expansion means that firms are able to sell in more cities
12. This 
market expansion will lead to a new equilibrium in which consumers in each city are able to 
buy from more firms. 
All cities are served by all firms in the first period. At the end of the first period, 
consumers within each city share their information on firm types. However, information 
does not flow across cities; that is, consumers from one city do not communicate with 
consumers in another city
13. As a consequence, in the second period, L-type firms stop 
                                                      
12 This would be the result of factors such as reductions in transport costs, new information and com-
munications technologies facilitating firm operations in more remote areas, or increases in openness to 
international trade. 
13 This assumption is motivated by the fact that not all consumption experiences are transmitted 
to all consumers as the number of local (and national) markets that are served by a given firm 
increases. For example, word-of-mouth across different local and national markets is much 
weaker than within a given local market, consumer magazines and associations tend to have a 
limited spatial coverage, and product reviews in the Internet are written in different languages 
that are specific to different countries, whereas the same firms may be selling in many of these 
local and national markets. This setting can also be interpreted in other ways. Formally, the sim-
plifying assumption in the model is that there is a partition over the set of consumers such that 







selling in those cities where they sold one or more lemons in the first period, whereas all 
H-type firms continue selling in all cities. Note that both types of firms obtain the same 
profits in the first period because there is still no specific information on individual firms 
and we restrict the analysis to pooling equilibria. However, H-type firms obtain higher 
expected profits in the second period, which compensates for their higher fixed costs. 
Depending on the size of  H K  relative to  L K  and the time discount, equilibria in which 
both types of firms are active may not exist or exist only for a given range of market 
sizes. We introduce sufficient conditions that guarantee that both types of firms are ac-
tive in equilibrium for a non-empty interval of market sizes. Outside that interval there is 
no uncertainty regarding product quality and therefore there is no trade-off between vari-
ety and information. 
As in subsection 2.1, we simplify the analysis by assuming that the fraction of L-
type firms that remain undisclosed in each city after the first period is equal to the expected 
value of this fraction. That is, a fraction 
/ An   of L-type firms remains undisclosed in each 
city after the first period, though not necessarily the same firms remain undisclosed in all 
cities. Firms are risk neutral. Hence, potential L-type entrant firms compute expected profits 
knowing that their probability of being undisclosed in a given city after the first period is 
/ An   or, equivalently, knowing that the expected fraction of cities in which they will con-
tinue selling in the second period is 





                                                                                                                                                      
this setting might be the following. There is a single city in which the set of consumers is parti-
tioned into z groups of friends. Each group of friends has A individuals. As the city grows, the 
number of friend groups increases, while the size A of each group remains constant. Each indi-
vidual shares information about her consumption experience in the previous period with all of the 







3.1. Equilibrium  with  endogenous entry and firm types 
Normalize  1 H K  . Using expression (9) for prices yields per firm gross profits in 
period t,  2
1
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        
      ( 1 5 )  
Assumption (1) implies that for an equilibrium with positive production to exist, 
some H-type firms must be active. Therefore, (14) must always be satisfied with equality. 
However, there may or may not be active L-type firms in equilibrium. If they are active, then 




























        ( 1 7 )  
These two expressions determine n and   as long as 01     and all consumers 
are willing to buy one unit of the good. 
Let us first consider expression (16), which defines a continuous mapping between 







decreasing, so that it can have at most one maximum, and it satisfies (0) 0 f   
14. Denote the 
maximum of  () f n  by S   , which is attained at n   (see figure 2.a). 
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Note: The mappings f (n) and g(n) represent the equilibrium conditions for the initial number of firms n and the initial share of high-type firms ρ, 
if both high- and low-type firms are active and all consumers buy one variety of the good. In turn, all consumers would be willing to buy one 
variety of the good if the pair (n, ρ) is above W (n, ρ), so that expected quality is high enough and distances between varieties and consumer 
preferences are low enough. 
 
                                                      
14 Note that 
2 /( ) / ( 1 ) df dn H x n x   , where     () 2 1 ( 1 )l n
LL H xK xx K x x       
and 
A
n x   , which is strictly increasing in n for  0 n  . Note that 
/1 3 ( ) ( 1 ) l n 0
LL dH dx x x K K x     , where the last inequality is a consequence of  1
L K  , 
1 x  , and 
L x K   (see equation [16]). Hence,  () H x  must be always positive, first positive and then 
negative, or always negative; and so must be  / df dn  because the term 
2 /( 1 ) nx    is strictly positive. 







Now, consider expression (17). We can use it to define a mapping  () g n   . 
Note that  () / 0 gn n    (see figure 2.b). The negative relationship between n and   
can be explained as follows. When firms choose their type, they face a trade-off between 
entry costs and expected second-period profits. Choosing to be L-type e involves a lower 
entry cost  L K , whereas choosing to be an H-type firm yields higher expected profits in 
the second period (when only H-type firms continue selling in all local markets or to all 
consumer groups). A large n increases the relative profits of L-type firms with respect to 
H-type firms because it reduces the chances that an L-type firm is disclosed (recall that 
consumers gather less information per firm at the end of the first period). This relative 
advantage for L-type firms can be compensated by lower  , because then a larger frac-
tion of the total number of firms abandon the market after the first period, leaving higher 
prices and profits to the remaining firms. This increases the discounted profits of H-type 
firms relative to L-type firms. Hence, a large n requires a low   in order that both types 
of firms have the same expected discounted profits. 
As already noted in the discussion of assumption (2), consumers may not buy 
any good if the expected quality is too low or the distance to the nearest firm is too large 
(i.e., if either   or n are too small). Denote by  (, ) Wn  the frontier of the (, ) n   pairs 
such that all consumers want to buy a unit of the good in the first period
15 (see figure 
2.b). Only points in the segment of  () g n  above  (, ) Wn  are potential equilibria in 
which all consumers would buy one variety of the good. The following two assumptions 
are sufficient conditions to guarantee that this segment is non-empty. 
Assumption (4)  3
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15   
2 3
2 (, ) { (, ) : ( 1 ) }
n Wn n R V c     
       . It is easy to see that  (, ) Wn   is 
decreasing and convex, and has 
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Assumption (4) above substitutes for assumption (2), which was only appropriate 
for exogenous   and n. It implies that V is large enough so that if there were only a 
single H-type firm, then all consumers would buy its output. In turn, assumption (5) im-
plies that if the market is so small that there is only room for a single firm, then in equi-
librium this single firm would be of H-type. That is, for  1 n   we would have  1    
16. 
Moreover, assumption (5) implies that the point (1,1) lies on or below  () g n , whereas 
assumption (4) implies that (1,1) lies on or above  (, ) Wn . Therefore,  () g n  and 
(, ) Wn  cross twice, leaving the point (1,1) in between. Denote by  ˆ ˆ (, ) n   the second 
crossing; see figure 2.b. Note that we always have  ˆ 0   . 
Now recall, that (16) and (17) determine n and   as long as 01    . However, if 








         ( 1 8 )  
Because  () g n  goes above the point (1, 1) , we necessarily have  1    for a seg-
ment  (0, ] L nn  , where  1 L n   (see figure 3.b). The reason why there are only H-type 
firms when n is small is intuitive. If there are few firms, then consumers rapidly accumulate 
a large amount of information per firm. As a result, they quickly discover L-type firms and 
stop buying from them. In our model, this means that L-type firms have a low probability of 
surviving at the end of the first period. This in turn prevents L-type firms from entering the 
market in the first period altogether. 
 
                                                      








  . The intuition is that if the number of 
firms is small (as is the case with  1 n  ), then consumers obtain a large amount of information about 
each firm’s type at the end of period 1. Therefore, the probability that an L-type firm survives at the 
end of this period is very low. This prevents L-type firms from entering the market in the first period 


























Note: For any market size [, ] SS S   , the inverse mapping n = F −1(S) determines the initial number of firms n. In turn, G(n) determines the 
initial share of H−type firms, ρ, as a function of n. 
 
Formally, for  (0, ] L nn  , the equilibrium relationship between n and S is not gi-
ven by (16) but by (18), whereas the equilibrium relationship between n and   is not given 
by (17) but by  1   . Also, note from (18) that the market size leading to a single active 
firm is  1/(1 ) S   . For  1/(1 ) S   , the market is too small for any firm to cover its 
fixed costs, and therefore no firm would produce the good. We need some additional nota-
tion to take these points into account. Denote  1/(1 ) S     ,  ˆ min{ , } nn n   ,  () Sf n  , 
and  () g n  
17. Furthermore, define the mappings  () : [ 1 , ] [, ] F nn S S   and 
() : [ 1 , ] [,1 ] Gn n    as: 
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      ( 2 0 )  
See figures 3.a and 3.b (the dotted lines correspond to the portions of  () f n  and 
() g n  that are not equal to  () Fn and  () Gn, respectively). For any market size  [, ] SS S  , 
the inverse of  () Fn determines the initial number of firms n. Then, given n,  () Gn deter-
mines the initial fraction   of H-type firms. For small market sizes (specifically, when 
L SS  ), consumers have plenty of information about the few existing firms. This makes it 
unprofitable to start an L-type firm. As the market increases in size (i.e., for  L SS  ), the 
share of L-type firms is positive and increasing. We thus have the following result: 
Proposition (4): Let assumptions (4) and (5) hold. There exists a range of market 
sizes [, ] SS , 0 SS , such that for each  [, ] SS S   there is an equilibrium in 
which there is positive production and each consumer buys one unit of the good. 
Moreover, in small markets (specifically if  [, ] L SS S  ,  L SS S   ), all firms are 
H-type, whereas in larger markets (i.e., if  (,] L SSS  ), there are active firms of 
both types. 
                                                                                                                                                      
ˆ nn   , there would be two equilibrium candidates for market sizes close to S ; i.e., for some SS  , 
but close to S , there would be two pairs (, ) n   satisfying equations (16) and (17) and the constraint 
defined by  (, ) Wn . Each of these two candidates would be on a different side of n  . However, a 
simple dynamic argument suggests that only the equilibrium candidate on the increasing side of  () f n  
(i.e., with nn   ) would be stable. To see this, consider an equilibrium pair (* ,* ) nS and then assume 
that S increases. If nothing else changes, then both types of firms would obtain strictly positive profits. 
Therefore, we should expect entry, i.e., an increase in n. Moreover, as the number of firms increases, 
L-type firms obtain relatively more profits than H-type firms, implying a decrease in  , as given by 
() g n . However, an equilibrium to the right of n   would imply the opposite. Hence, we restrict our 







3.2.  Comparative statics: expanding markets 
The following result is an almost immediate implication of the previous proposition 
and summarizes the effects of expanding markets on average product quality. 
Proposition (5): Let assumptions (4) and (5) hold and consider market sizes in the 
interval [, ] SS . As the market expands, the number of firms increases, which im-
plies lower prices and a wider variety of goods. On the negative side, for 
(,) L SSS  ,  L SS S  , average product quality (in both periods) decreases as 
the market expands. This is the consequence of the fact that the initial share and the 
survival rate of L-type firms increases with market size. 
Proof. See appendix A in section 5. 
Intuitively, if consumer information is linked to past experiences of consumption, 
then a large number of firms slows down consumer accumulation of information per firm, 
thereby facilitating L-type firms to continue selling after the first period, as argued in section 
2. This negative effect on expected quality is reinforced if firms choose their type; as mar-
kets become large and consumers have less information on each firm, an increasing fraction 
of firms choose to be L-type . 
3.3. Welfare 
Can the reduction in expected quality resulting from larger markets outweigh the so-
cial welfare benefits of lower prices and wider consumption variety? We now explore this 
question. We only refer to social welfare because profits are now zero and therefore con-
sumer surplus is identical to social welfare. As before, we focus on equilibria such that all 
consumers buy one unit of the good. Thus, we consider  [, ] SS S  . 
Expected discounted social welfare is now: 







where, as in section 2,    51 / PD D c     , and Q and D are given by (8). However, 
note that in this context n and   are endogenous variables that depend on market size. Dif-
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MIE stands for marginal information effect (per unit of V) with respect to increasing market 
size, whereas MPDE stands for marginal price and distance effect (per unit of  ). These 
effects are functions of market size, as drawn in figures 4.a and 4.b. 
The arguments regarding the existence of a market size S
  that maximizes social 
welfare are similar to those in the previous section. Consider first MPDE. As market size 
and the number of firms increase, the additional benefits of price reductions and higher 
proximity are monotonically decreasing; i.e., the absolute value of MPDE is decreasing 
for all the relevant range [, ] SS  of market size. In contrast, MIE is not monotonic. If the 
market is small (i.e., for  [, ] L SS S   ) all firms are H-type. Therefore, as market size in-
creases within (, ) L SS, there is no reduction in consumer information and expected qual-
ity. Thus, welfare is increasing within this interval. However, when the market becomes 
large enough (specifically, for  L SS  ), consumer information per firm deteriorates and 
we have  1   . This reduces expected quality and makes additional information on firm 
type to become more valuable. Thus, MIE jumps from 0 to strictly positive (in absolute 
value) at  L S . Hence, MIE starts going in the opposite direction that MPDE. 
Is there an optimal market size 
SW S ? If the quality value V is very small relative 







That is,  VM I E   may lie below  MPDE     for the entire interval [, ] SS . Hence, so-
cial welfare always increases with market size. However, if V is sufficiently large or   is 
sufficiently small, then there is an optimal market size from the point of view of social 
welfare. There are two possible cases as illustrated in figures 4.a and 4.b. In the first case, 
VM I E   and  MPDE    cross each other at 
SW S  such that 
SW
L SS S    (note that 
VM I E   approaches from below, satisfying the second order conditions of a maximum). 
In the second case, which occurs for very large values of V (figure 4.b),  VM I E   is 
above  MPDE    at  L SS  . Therefore,  L S  is the market size that maximizes social 
welfare. 
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Note: Marginal information effect (MIE) and marginal price-and-distance effect (MPDE) as a function of market size S. The figures show the two 
possible cases for the size S
SW that maximizes social welfare. 







Finally, note that the  () VM I E S   curve shifts upward as V increases, whereas the 
() MPDE S    curve shifts downward when   decreases, thereby reducing 
SW S  if 
SW
L SS  . The following proposition summarizes these findings. 
Proposition (6): Let assumptions (4) and (5) hold and consider market sizes such 
that in equilibrium, each consumer buys one variety of the good (i.e.,  [, ] SS S  ). 
If the value of consuming good quality is large enough with respect to the value of 
proximity (i.e., for  / V   sufficiently large), then there exists a market size SSW, 
[,)
SW
L SS S  , that maximizes expected social welfare. For  ,
SW SS   the posi-
tive (marginal) price and distance effects produced by a large market are outweighed 
by the negative (marginal) expected-quality effect. Moreover, if 
SW
L SS   , then 
SSW strictly decreases with V and increases with  . 
Proof. See appendix A in section 5. 
4. Concluding  Comments 
THE number of brands, models, and sellers available to consumers has soared over the 
last decades. If consumer information about each product’s quality is linked to the quan-
tity that was consumed in the past by a given group of individuals, then a larger number 
of varieties may imply less information on average about the quality of each variety. 
This circumstance may in turn decrease incentives among firms to produce high-quality 
goods. Benefits from lower prices and wider diversity that tend to go along with a larger 
number of firms may compensate for lower average quality, but this is not necessarily 
the case. We have shown that beyond some point, social welfare may decrease as a result 
of the increase in the number of firms and the resulting decrease in consumer informa-
tion on each firm. 
It has long been recognized that under asymmetric information, markets may be inef-







of the market. For instance, standard information mechanisms such as word-of-mouth may 
work well in relatively small markets but may not work so effectively if markets grow large. 
This may be important in the era of global markets. 
Thus, the bottom line of this paper is that information mechanisms need to be im-
proved as globalization progresses and product supply widens. Otherwise, lower prices and 
broader variety may go along with increasing asymmetric information inefficiencies. Market 
incentives and new technologies are giving rise to new information mechanisms. However, 
because consumer information has public good characteristics, it cannot be taken for granted 
that the new information mechanisms are rapidly and efficiently developed in all markets so 
as to overcome the limitations of the traditional information mechanisms (such as word-of-
mouth). Analyzing how efficient the new mechanisms are in responding to the wider infor-
mation problems raised by the expansion and globalization of markets is an important ave-
nue for further research. 
5.  Appendix A: Relegated Proofs 
5.1.  Proof of proposition (1) 
Consider expressions (7) and (8). Taking the derivative of (7) with respect to n yields 
  () () dE SW Qn Dn
dn n n V 

    , where 
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  are negative and bounded for any  0 n  , and 
these two derivatives are independent from V and  . Therefore, given any number of firms 





   . Hence, because 
  dE SW
dn  is continuous in n, there is at least some number of firms 
SW n , 
0 0




dn  . 
Note that if there is a single value of n for which 
  0
dE SW
dn  , then 
22
22
() () Qn Dn
nn V 

     must be true at this point (see figure 1). Therefore, this point corre-




dn  , only points such that 
22
22
() () Qn Dn
nn V 

     correspond to local 
maxima. Therefore, in any case, the global maximum 
SW n  decreases as a result of an in-
crease in V or a reduction in  . Graphically, the  / VQn     curve shifts upward as V in-
creases, whereas the  / D n     curve shifts downward as   decreases.   
5.2.  Proof of proposition (3) 
Using   0 lim 0, 1 n Bn     from assumption (3) in (13), we find that 
0 lim (1 ) n Q       and  1
0 4 lim 1 n n D 
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  are negative and bounded. From here on, the argument is the same as 
in the proof of proposition (1). Because these derivatives are independent from V and  , 
given any 





   . Hence, by 
continuity, there exists a number of firms nSW, 
0 0
SW nn   , that maximizes social wel-








  . Again, local maxima corre-




   approaches from below. Hence, no matter which of 
the local maxima is the global maximum 
SW n , 
SW n  decreases as a result of an increase in V 
or a reduction in  .  
5.3.  Proof of proposition (5) 
Denote the equilibrium values of n and   by  * n  and  *  , respectively. From (19) 
and (20), we find that  /0 nS
    and  /0 n 
   for  [, ] SS S  , with strict inequality 







there are few firms (i.e.,  [1, ) L nn  ), and all firms are H-type. Hence, as the market ex-
pands within (, ) L SS, there is no reduction in expected quality. However, at  L S , consumer 
information per firm deteriorates to the extent that starting an L-type firm becomes profit-
able. Thus, for  L SS  , we find that  /( / ) ( / ) 0 Sn n S 
          . This reduces 
expected quality in both periods (see equations [3] and [6]). In addition to this negative ef-
fect on quality through the initial share of L-type firms, there is the negative effect already 
analyzed in section 2 namely, that larger n results in less information on each firm at the end 
of the first period, which allows more L-type firms to survive into the second period.  
5.4.  Proof of proposition (6) 
First, we prove that for a large enough  / V  , there is always a market size 
[,)
SW
L SS S   that maximizes expected social welfare. Recall that 
 /( ) ( ) dE SW dS V MIE S MPDE S     , where  () 0
QQ n
nn S MIE S


    
        and 
() 0 PD PD n
nn S MPDE S


    
       for  [, ] SS S  . These inequalities can be confirmed 















    

   
  
   . 
As explained in the main text () 0 MIE S   for  [, ) L SS S  , and so welfare is in-
creasing in this interval. Then, note that for  (,] L SSS  , both  () MIE S  and  () MPDE S  
are bounded and strictly negative. Moreover, they do not depend on V or  . Hence, given 
, S  for sufficiently large  / V  , we find that  () () VM I E S M P D E S     . Therefore, 
because  () MIE S  and  () MPDE S  are continuous for  (,] L SSS  , there are two possible 







market size  (,]
SW
L SS S   such that  () ()
SW SW VM I E S M P D E S      (see figure 4.a); 
or  () () VM I E S M P D E S      for  L SS  , in which case 
SW
L SS   (see figure 4.b). 
Finally, note that if there is a single crossing between  () VM I E S   and 
() MPDE S    within the interval  [,) L SSS  , the slopes satisfy  MIE MPDE
SS V  
     . 
Therefore, the crossing corresponds to a maximum. However, there could be more than one 
crossing. In this case, only crossings such that  MIE MPDE
SS V  
      correspond to local 
maxima. In any case, the global maximum decreases as a result of an increase in V or a re-
duction in  .  
6.  Appendix B: Alternative Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs 
AS noted in the main text, Salop’s (1979) price can be sustained in the first period by 
appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs. In this appendix, we consider some alternative 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs that may be of interest that lead to lower equilibrium prices. 
We assume that consumers draw no strategic inference whatsoever about a firm’s type 
from its mere decision to deviate. Then, we consider the potential incentives among H-
type firma to deviate to decrease prices in the first period in order to increase sales and 
generate a larger sample of their product. This would increase consumer willingness to 
pay for the firm’s output in the second period. 
As in the main text, we restrict our attention to pooling symmetric equilibria. Recall 
that as a result of assumption (1), the sales of L-type firms would be zero in a separating 
equilibrium. First, we analyze equilibrium in the last period. Let 
II
i p  be firm i’s price in the 
second period and 
II p  be the price for other firms. Consider expected utility of a consumer 
who is indifferent to buying from i versus buying from the nearest alternative firm. Expected 




ii i i II VEq p y VEq p y
n
     








where  i y  is the distance between this consumer and firm i,  () i Eq  is expected qual-
ity of firm i’s output in the second period,  () Eq is the expected quality of other firms, and 
II n  is the number of firms in the second period. Thus, firm i’s market share in the second 
period is: 
1
2· ( ) · ( )
II II




     

 
Its discounted expected profit is: 
 ·() ·( )
II II II II
ii i i II
A





      

 
It is easy to compute prices in the symmetric equilibrium. The first-order conditions 
for a Nash equilibrium in the second period ( /0
II II
ii dd p   ) together with symmetry 
( () ( ) i Eq Eq   and 
III I
i pp  ) yield  II
II
n p c    , which is Salop’s (1979) price. 
Let 
I
i p  be firm i’s price in the first period and 
I p  be the price for other firms. How would 
an H-type firm’s second-period expected profit change if it deviated in the first period by setting 
I
i p  below 
I p ? This would increase both its first-period sales and consumer willingness to pay for 
its product in the second period. Note that 
II
i   is a function of  () , ( ) , , ,
III I
ii Eq Eq p p  and 
nII;   () , ( ) , , ,
II II II II II
ii i i E qE qppn   . Hence, we are interested in 
() ( )
() ( )
II II II II II II II II II
iii i i i i i
I I I I II I II I II
ii i i i i i i
d dE q dE q dp dp dn
dp E q dp E q dp p dp p dp n dp
       
   
   
 
Assuming n is large, we can ignore the effects of i’s decisions on  () Eq, 
II p , and 
II n . Moreover, we note that    (1 )
A

















i p . In turn, the envelope theorem tells us that  /0
II II
ii p     because we are 





























ii ii i i
I II
ii i ii i
dd E q d E q d X
Eq Eq d X dp dp dp
  
  . 
Now, let us analyze price decisions in the first period. Consider expected utility for a 
consumer who is indifferent to buying from i versus buying from the nearest alternative firm. 
Denoting the distance between this consumer and firm i by  i x , we have: 
 
1
(1 ) (1 )
II
ii i Vp x Vp x
n
               

 
Hence  2( ) /
II
ii i n Xxp p     . Thus, firm i’s first-period profit is   
  
II I I A
ii i n pp pc 
     . Then, the first-order condition from maximizing total ex-
pected profit with respect to 
I
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  above. Substituting the ex-
pression above for 
II
i p  and using symmetry (i.e., 
I I
i pp   and  1/ i X n  ) yields: 
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Recall that Salop’s (1979) price is 
t t n Pc    . Hence, we find that  ;
I p P   note 
that the last term in the expression above is negative. From this expression, define 
  
3
ln (1 ) 1 / (1 ) 0
A
A n
n V CS A n                

. Consumer surplus 







Therefore, consumer surplus is larger in the equilibrium under the alternative out-of-
equilibrium beliefs considered in this appendix. 
Now, we can show that proposition (2) holds in this equilibrium. Recall that the key 
point in the proof of proposition (2) was to show that  / dCS dn  is positive for n sufficiently 
close to 0 and negative thereafter if  / V   is sufficiently large. We now prove that the deriva-
tive of the new additional term  CS   in consumer surplus with respect to n is positive for 
sufficiently small n and negative for sufficiently large n. We find that: 
  

      4
2
ln (1 ) 1






A dC S V A
dn n n
  
      
  
               
 
This derivative is continuous and its sign only depends on the sign of the term within 
square brackets. Note that this term is positive for n sufficiently close to 0 and negative for 
sufficiently large n. Therefore, for large enough  / V   expected consumer surplus is maxi-
mized for a finite (initial) number of firms 
CS n . Beyond 
CS n , the positive price and distance 
effect of a larger number of firms is outweighed by the negative effect of lower expected 
quality. 
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